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This dissertation consists of two essays on institutional trading around the world.
The rst essay (Chapter 1) investigates the trading behavior of institutional investors
from 28 countries around the world. During the period from 1999 to 2008, we nd
strong empirical evidence that institutional investors tend to move their funds out
of volatile foreign equity markets and back to their home markets, particularly
following the recent 2007-2008 global nancial crisis. Our results also show that
institutional investors prefer to hold more liquid stocks in highly volatile markets,
suggesting evidence of ight to liquidity. Institutional investors are also inclined
to increase the level of liquidity of their home portfolios relative to that of their
foreign portfolios when there is a surge in foreign market volatility. Finally, evidence
supports that the overall portfolio risk of institutional investors reduces during the
nancial crisis period.
The second essay (Chapter 2) studies the impact of market sentiment on institu-
tional home bias around the world. The paper explores the eects of three investor
sentiment measures on institutional home bias from 1999 to 2009 for 14 institutional
domiciled countries based on Factset Lionshares and Worldscope data. WE show a
negative signicant impact of global investor sentiment on institutional home bias.
We provide the empirical evidence that global investor sentiment index reduces the
institutional home bias in the international market during the past decase. Local
ii
and total market sentiment do not show the statistically signicant eects on home
bias. Distance and language have positive and negative eects on institutional home
bias, respectively. Investor protection variables such as rule of law index and risk
of expropriation index have a signicant positive eect and negative eect on insti-
tutional over-weighted investment on domestic market. Our ndings are robust for
the sample either including or excluding the U.S. market.
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1Chapter 1
ESSAY 1: INSTITUTIONAL TRADING
BEHAVIOR AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISES
1.1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a steady growth of institutional investors around the
world. There were over 4; 000 global institutions in year 2008, compared to only
around 1; 400 institutions worldwide in year 2000. Institutional investors manage
over $53 trillion dollars around the world in year 2005 with half of the amount being
attributable to U.S. institutions.: In the U.S. market, institutional investors hold
46:6 percent of the total stock market value in 1987 and 76:4 percent in 2007.;
The trend of institutionalization that had been pronounced during the last
decade leads to an enormous literature that has extensively examined the trading
characteristics of institutional investors emphasizing on the U.S. market.x Insti-
tutions exhibit the feedback trading, herding, and momentum trading behavior.{
Guercio(1996) shows that institutions demonstrate strong preference for quality s-
Institutional holding data is from the Factset Lionshares, a primary source for equity ownership
of global institutions located in the U.S.
:This number has been more than doubled during the past decade according to Global Financial
Stability Report from International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2007.
;According to the report by the Conference Board in Institutional Investment Report in Septem-
ber 2008.
xRefer to Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Schwartz (1991).
{Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) address the evidence of two types of institutional
trading behaviors: herding, dened as institutional investors buying or selling the same stock
simultaneously, and feedback trading, dened as institutional investors buying past winners and
selling past losers, by using a sample of the U.S. pension funds.
2tocks and that little momentum trading strategies. Apart from institutional trading
patterns, researchers are also interested in how institutional ownership is related to
asset pricing and its possible eects on market stability.}
Few papers, however, are devoted to investigating the institutional holding pref-
erence, especially when markets are set in extreme volatility. Bennett, Sias, and
Starks (2003) nd that institutional investors have switched their preference from
large rms between 1983 and 1997 toward small and risky securities - a preference
shift motivated by institutional investors' belief that small stocks provide \greener
pastures". Huang (2008) examines liquidity preference of U.S. mutual funds and
nds that mutual fund managers prefer more liquid stocks when the market is ex-
pected to go down. Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2008) show large negative
market returns decrease liquidity much more than positive returns increase liquidity,
particulary for high volatility returns. Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) present
evidence that investors demand credit quality and liquidity in general. Yet, in times
of market depression, investors chase liquidity, not credit quality, based on a sample
of Euro-area bond markets.
This paper investigates institutional holding preference from January 1999 to
December 2008 focusing on three issues: ight home, ight to liquidity, and ight
to safety (i.e., risk shifting), based on two primary datasets Factset Lionshares and
Datastream. We particularly look into the recent nancial crisis period of 2007-2008
which gives us a good opportunity to investigate such trading behavior.
We focus on the trading behavior of institutional investors domiciled in 28 home
countries and their investment spreading 52 target countries. We dene domestic
institutions as institutions who invest greater than or equal to 80% of the total
assets in domestic market throughout the sample period; otherwise, institutions are
classied as the international institutions. We exclude pure domestic institutions
}See Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show a positive relation between institutional ownership and
stock returns as well as lag stock returns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) prove that institutions
aects positively stock prices.
3that never invest outside of their home countries throughout the sample period. So
all institutions in the sample must hold at least one foreign market traded stock
in one semester. Note international institutions based on our denition constitute
the majority of institutions around the world by the total holding assets market
capitalization.
This paper provides empirical evidence of institutional trading behavior. First of
all, we nd that institutions tend to move out of volatile foreign markets and move
back to home markets when foreign markets in which they invest become volatile.
Our result shows that the change of foreign market volatility is positively associated
with the change of proportion of institutional domestic investment. The positive
association becomes pronounced during high volatility periods in foreign markets.
The empirical evidence still holds after controlling the volatility of institutional
home countries. Our estimates indicate that institutions tend to switch to their
home markets to better cope with the individual redemption, other possible nancial
needs, and avoid the nancial turmoil when the foreign markets becomes intensively
volatile.
Furthermore, we form two sub-samples by separating the above and below the
time-series average of foreign market volatility. Due to the increasing integrity of
the world market, the home volatility is highly correlated with the foreign market
volatilities in the sample. We rerun the regression to see how institutional investors
adjust their home and foreign portfolios when facing the higher-than-average and
lower-than-average changes in foreign markets. All types of institutions including the
U.S. international and domestic institutions, non-U.S. domestic and international
institutions show the evidence of ight home in the face of volatile foreign markets.
For instance, domestic institutions constitute only 1% of total institutional total net asset-
s(TNA) in developed countries and only 4% in developing countries. 40 countries have more
international institutions than domestic institutions. Take the U.S. for instance, the U.S. has the
largest number of institutions, among them 23% is domestic institution and 77% is international
institution, which is nearly three times of domestic institutions. Moreover, the percentage of inter-
national institutional TNA counts approximately 99% among developed countries and 95% among
developing countries by the end of year 2008. Refer to Table 1.
4Moreover, we identify market crises time by looking at the semester in which
the market return is 1.3 standard deviation below the mean of market returns ex-
perienced in the 1965-2010 time frame. Based on our denition of the crisis, the
U.S. market had three crises time periods: the Internet bubble in 2000, the stock
market downturn after September 11 in 2002, and the most recent nancial crisis
in 2007-2008, that was marked by the Lehman brothers bankruptcy in September
2008. This regression result also supports the ight home evidence. Compared to
previous nancial crises, the most recent crisis in 2007-2008 apparently aects in-
stitutional decisions on reallocating to the home market more than previous crises.
For instance, institutions decrease their foreign investments by 0.039, three times
more than the 0.013 before 2007. The evidence becomes stronger at the 1% level
in the biggest two institution domiciled home countries, knowing, the U.S. and the
U.K., than in another countries.
We run robustness tests to consider the possibility that this ight to home ev-
idence might be driven purely by price uctuations. We recompute the change of
the institutional domestic holding percentage by summing up the change of hold-
ing shares in domestic stocks multiplied by the corresponding stock price for each
institution, scaled on an institutions' total portfolio value. In addition, we consider
the possible eects of home market uctuations. Again, the regression of robustness
conrms institutional ight home trading behavior.
Next, we provide evidence that institutional investors appear to increase their
holding liquidity level during the downturn economy situation faced by foreign mar-
kets in which they have an investment. This aptness is strengthened particularly for
the non-U.S. institutions. We use the proportion of zero daily returns as the illiquid-
ity measure proposed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) for securities around
the world. As for the robustness test, we use the weighted average of holding secu-
rity illiquidity ranks as institutional illiquidity scores. We nd a signicant negative
5relationship between the institutions overall investment illiquidity level and foreign
market volatility. To the robustness test, we add the market volatility of institution
host countries as control variables. The conclusion still stands up and remains high-
ly signicant. Institution overall illiquidity scores based on the rankings of holding
stock illiquidity in each exchange market. The negative relation between institution
overall illiquidity scores on their investments and foreign volatilities holds as well
for both international and domestic institutions. Moreover, the U.S. institutions,
which count for almost half of observations in our sample, show a stronger increasing
switch to liquid assets than the non-US institutions. International institutions show,
at the same time, a higher upward adjustment on liquid assets investment than their
domestic peers who mainly face the turmoil spread in their home countries.
On the other hand, home market volatilities also negatively aect institutions
holding illiquidity level. The U.S. institutions who invest much more in domes-
tic market compared to other country domiciled institutions show the particularly
strong eect revealed through a negative home market downturn. Thus home market
volatilities play an important role in institutional decisions on adjusting the overall
portfolio level. Our evidence supports the previous researching ndings, that high
market volatilities drive up institutional demand for liquid assets.
To further investigate ight to liquidity evidence, we run two additional robust-
ness tests. First, we consider the relative domestic portfolio liquidity, meaning, we
compute the ratio of weighted average of domestic portfolio illiquidity to weight-
ed average of foreign portfolio illiquidity. The regression of such relative domestic
portfolio liquidity supports our previous conclusion on institutional ight to liquid-
ity evidence. The other question is whether our results are driven by changes of
stock illiquidity measure, since market volatility inevitably aects individual trad-
ing stocks' liquidity. We recompute the changes in institutional portfolio illiquidity
by xing stocks illiquidity at the beginning of the time period and take into con-
6sideration the buying or selling of stocks of the institutions. Our regression rmly
assure our ight to liquidity evidence.
Last, based on our ndings on ight home and ight to liquidity evidence, we can
conclude that institutions are able to reduce their holding portfolio risk level. We
use a holding-based risk shifting measure, based on the dierence between current
holding volatility and the past realized holding volatility proposed by Huang, Sialm,
and Zhang (2010). We nd a signicant negative relation between the foreign market
volatility and the risk shifting measure, dened as the dierence of institutional
current holding standard deviation and the past realized portfolio return standard
deviation. Our estimation suggests that if foreign markets potentially become more
volatile, then institutions may want to decrease their holdings risk level for the
purpose of grabbing investment opportunities. The negative eect of foreign market
volatility on institutional holding risk level exists for both international and domestic
institutions, particularly for non-U.S. institutions. Our result also suggests that the
U.S. domestic institutions are more apt to decrease the overall investment risk level
than international institutions when home market shows a sign of turmoil.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature
review of the institutional trading behaviors, particularly during the crisis period.
In section 3, we describe the databases and sample statistics for institutions around
the world, including a primary description of institutional holding characteristic-
s. Section 4 presents the investigation on institutional investor behaviors of ight
home, followed by the regression results and interpretations. Section 5 examines
institutional investors' holding portfolio liquidity level. Section 6 presents empiri-
cal results on the implication of institutional reducing the risk exposure to volatile
markets. Section 7 concludes.
71.2 Literature review
The paper contributes to literatures on investigating the institutional trading be-
haviors in general. Guercio (1996) presents the evidence of prudent-man laws of
institutional trading patterns and nd that bank managers prefer high quality s-
tocks in their portfolios. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that institutional in-
vestors do not engage in momentum trading strategies by using a sample of the
U.S. institutions over the 1980 to 1996 period. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show a
positive relation between institutional ownership and stock returns as well as lag
stock returns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) present the evidence that institutional
ownership not only positively aects stock prices and returns but also positively fore-
casts expected stock returns. Vayanos (2001) shows that large traders, for instance,
mutual funds and pension funds tend to manipulate the market with a selling high
and buying low strategy by constructing a dynamic model mimicking the nancial
market with a strategic trader as well as noise traders. In this paper, we not only
demonstrate the institutional investing patterns from 1999 through 2008, but also
show the dynamic holding changes during the recent nancial crisis of 2007-08.
Institutional investors are known for investing in their domestic market more
heavily than in foreign markets. Karolyi and Stulz (2003) investigate whether -
nancial assets priced locally or globally. Lau, Ng, and Zhang (2010) nd that home
bias is strongly related to the variations in the cost of capital around the world.
Starting from home bias, we are interested in whether this home bias propensi-
ty would be intensied when institutions are facing the adverse economic macro
condition. Haas and Horen (2011) nd that banks lend more to countries nearby
geographically where they are incorporated with domestic co-lenders. Further, Gi-
annetti and Laeven (2012) test the ight home eect in the international market
for syndicated loan market. The authors nd that the home bias of lenders' loan
increases signicantly in the original market in the presence of an economic crisis.
8Our paper shows the increasing of the proportion of institutional holding in domes-
tic market from 1999 to 2009, based on a conclusive holding data of institutional
investors around the world and our following regressions support the ight to home
hypothesis.
Institutional investors are proven to show preference to liquid assets in the past
literature. Scholes (2000) proposes that nancial institutions need to nd more
liquid assets in terms of producing dynamic cushions in order to reduce the volatility
price. Goyenko and Sarkissian (2007) use the illiquidity of the U.S. short-term
Treasury bond as a measure of joint fact of ight to liquidity and ight quality. The
authors nd that this measure strongly predict the local market returns and stock
market illiquidity. Huang (2008) shows that the U.S. mutual funds tend to hold more
cash and liquid stocks forecasting the coming of a market turmoil condition. On the
other hand, David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) demonstrate that hedge funds
sell more liquid assets during the crisis compared to mutual funds which indicates
the vulnerability of hedge funds to an external source of funding.
Interestingly, between choosing ight to liquidity and ight to quality ::, Be-
ber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2008) nd that for the Euro-area bond market, bond
investors chase liquidity instead of quality when facing a market stressing period.
We contribute to the literature by testing whether institutional investors tend to
exhibit ight to liquidity and ight to quality across the ten-year time period of
1999 through 2008.
1.3 Data and summary statistics
We retrieve the global institutional investor holding data from FactSet LionShares
from January 1999 to December 2008. 13F ling is the primary source of Fact-
::Flight to quality refers to the time when risky assets become illiquid, see Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2008).
9Set LionShares for institutional ownership of U.S.-traded securities.13F lings are
mandatory imposed by the SEC for any institutional investors including foreign
institutional investors managing over $100 million or more on Section 13 securi-
ties. A complete list of Section 13 securities is available on the SEC's website at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ists.htm at the end of each quarter.
As mentioned in FactSet LionShares documentation, some institutional investors
also report their holding of non-U.S. traded equity, although it is not required. In
such case, FactSet set the default source of institutions holding as 13F, depending
on the portion of this institution's non-U.S. portfolio that is reported to 13F. Our
study includes all types of institutions and all types of securities. Institutional own-
ership data of non-U.S. trades securities are obtained from publicly available infor-
mation source, such as annual reports, rms' websites, transaction announcements,
regulatory news service, and company proxies, etc. FactSet LionShares collects in-
stitutional investor ownership data across regions in Asia, Africa, Europe, North
America, Latin America, Pacic, and Middle West since January 1999. Our sample
covers the holding data of institutions domiciled in 28 countries with investments
in 52 target countries over the period from January 1999 to December 2008, in-
cluding 19 developed countries and 9 developing countries.;; We consider all types
of institutions in our paper, including arbitrage, bank management division, bro-
ker, broker/investment bank asset management, corporate, foundation/endowment,
fund, fund distributor, government(Federal/Local/Agency), hedge fund company,
insurance company, insurance management division, investment adviser, investment
banking, market maker, mutual fund manager, pension fund, private banking port-
folio, research rm, stock borrowing/lending, and venture capital/private equity.
Data of securities held by institutional investors, including returns, prices, trading
;;Those 40 countries must have the complete MSCI daily returns from January, 1999 to Decem-
ber, 2008; must have the non missing holdings within the recent ve years from 2004 to 2008; must
have at least 10 institutions from Lionshares Factset report. Therefore, some countries, such as
New Zealand, Croatia, Pakistan, Slovenia, Turkey and Vietnam are dropped from our sample.
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volumes, market capitalizations, etc., are retrieved from Datastream. To combine
the institutional investors holding data from FactSet LionShares and the individual
securities data from Datastream, we use ISIN codes, SEDOL codes and CUSIP. In
addition, market level monthly returns from Datastream provides country bench-
mark indices for measuring market volatility.
For institutional holding securities, the initial holding data retrieved from Fact-
set Lionshares is composed by 36,266 securities from 117 countries and traded in
102 exchange markets. Among these securities, 34; 134 securities are matched with
Datastream to obtain the security-level information. The nal sample has 34,134
securities. We require that the home country must have at least 10 dierent insti-
tutions in the sample period. As for institutions, the initial holding data includes
5; 632 institutions from 80 countries. After combining holding data with the avail-
able security information from Datastream and retaining institution holdings across
52 target countries, the nal sample has 5; 467 institutions from 19 developed coun-
tries and 9 developing countries.
We choose the semi-annual year-end holdings for institutions rather than quarter-
end or year-end reporting as the holding frequency. The reporting frequencies of
institutional holdings data from Factset Lionshares are quarterly, semi-annually, or
annually. For instance, Japan's institutional holdings are based on annual frequency,
while the U.S. reports regularly on a quarterly basis. We set up the semi-annual
holding frequency to capture accurately the adjustment of institutional holdings
while accommodating the reporting discrepancy among countries during the same
time.
In the paper, we examine institutional holdings from the rst semi-annual year
of 1999 to the second semi-annual year of 2008. Table 1 describes the institutional
investor holdings and characteristics at the country level in 1999-2008 by taking
the time-series of cross-sectional average. We rst compute institutional TNA on a
11
semi-annual basis and then compute the average within the same year. Table 1 thus
reports the annual total asset holdings, the percentage of domestic asset holdings,
number of international institutions and domestic institutions, domestic institution
investment in the home country, home market and foreign market volatility, return,
investment portfolio concentration, turnover, and institution ow by country.
Compared to institutional investors domiciled in other countries, the U.S. in-
stitutions have the largest total net asset (TNA). Note that the U.S. institutions
heavily invest in the domestic market from 99% in 1999 to 90% in 2008, while other
country's institutions have less domestic security holdings. That is, all the develope-
d country institutions other than the U.S. domiciled institutions on average invest
more in foreign developed markets than their home markets. The U.K. institution
ranks the second highest in asset holdings, and then followed by Canada, France,
and Sweden at the end of year 2008. On the other hand, we see a dierent trend
for developing country's domiciled institutions, i.e., they mainly invest in foreign
markets rather than their home markets, accompanied by a lower total asset values.
In order to examine institutional trading behavior during the extreme market
time period, it is important to set up the denition for crisis time period. In the
paper, we dene the crisis time period as the time when the market return is 1.3
standard deviation less than the time-series average of market return based on the
monthly market return data we retrieved from Datastream from 1965 to 2011.Choos-
ing 1.3 standard deviation below the mean market return is not random. It is the
minimum requirement to include three major crisis time period in the U.S., which
are the year 2000 marked by the internet bubble, the year 2002 marked by the s-
tock market shutdown following September 11, 2001, and the year 2008 marked by
Lehman Brothers ling for bankruptcy. Following the denition, we include the sec-
ond semi-annual of year 2008 as one of crisis time periods for all countries, marked
by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other crisis time periods include the sec-
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ond semi-annual of 2000 for Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and
the U.S., accompanied by the Internet bubble within our sample period from 1999
to 2009. The years 2000 and 2001 are also dened as the crisis time period for a
few major developed countries such as Finland, France, Germany, Singapore, and
Switzerland. The second semi-annual 2008 is the crisis time period for 50 out of 52
countries we investigate. There are no crisis time periods dened from 2003 through
2007.
Previous literatures show that institutional investors ow aects their trading
behaviors. Edelen and Warner (2001) show the empirical evidence of the relation
between trading activity and ow for open-end mutual fund. In this paper we use the
ow to investigate the buy-and-sell behaviors of institutions in each period during
1999-2008. The percentage of an institutional i overall ow during the time period
t is dened as the growth rate of the holding assets, assuming all the new cash ows
are reinvested in the next period. Mathematically, we compute institutional FLOW
as follows,
FLOWi;t  TNAi;t  TNAi;t1p1 Ri;tq
TNAi;t1
where Ri;t is the weighted average of return for the institution i at time period t.
Similarly, we compute the ow of an institution to the domestic market and the ow
to the foreign developed markets by considering institutional holdings in domestic
market traded assets and the foreign markets traded assets, and institutional hold-
ing returns from domestic markets investments and foreign markets investments,
correspondingly.
In order to capture the volatile condition for institution home country and foreign
countries, we use the standard deviation of institutional home market returns as
the proxy for home market volatility. The volatility of institutional investment in
foreign countries is captured by market value-weighted average of foreign markets
return standard deviation Institution concentration equals to the reciprocal of the
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number of distinct stocks held by an institution. Institutional performance in terms
of returns on a semi-annual basis is measured by the market weighted average of
holding stock returns. Flow represents the growth rate of institutional total asset
values. Institutional total asset holding takes the log of institutional holding asset
values. Institution investment portfolio turnover ratio is proxyed by the minimum
of aggregate buys or sales of holding assets divided by the institutional TNA.
The other two important control variables are supported by the proportion of
the domestic institutions' investment in their home countries and the proportion of
home stock market value as the world stock market value. These two variables used
in the regression equation later are to control the eects of large stock markets such
as the U.S. and U.K., which are heavily invested by institutional investors across the
world. This partly corrects the eect of home bias on our conclusion when testing
ight home, ight to liquidity, and ight to safety.
The next thing is to see how institutional investors react to the economic down-
turn by adjusting their overall holdings liquidity. Since liquidity has always been
one of the top concerns of institutional investors, the question comes to, what is the
relatively appropriate liquidity measure for the purpose of our study on institutional
investments in international nancial markets. High liquidity leads to low transac-
tion costs, low information asymmetry, low nancial risk, thus aects stock returns
and institution investment decisions. See Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Amihud
(2002), Amihud, Mendelson, and Peterson (2005). Previous papers use rm size,
turnover ratio, bid-ask spread, and Amihud illiquidity ratios. In this paper, we use
the zero-proportion measure proposed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) to
gauge stock's illiquidity level. That is, we use the proportion of zero daily returns
with respect to the total number of existing trading days within each semi-annual
year as a measure of stock illiquidity. This method simply uses the zero returns
proportion in a certain time period to proxy the transaction costs. Intuitively, a
14
high transaction cost security would be more likely to be less frequently traded and
thus more zero returns would be generated. Lee (2011) uses the same measure to in-
vestigate the price of liquidity risk worldwide and argue that using a liquidity proxy
that is based only on returns ts international nancial markets appropriately.
To have a clear picture of a security's illiquidity level within its trading markets,
we rst retrieve the daily returns of the available daily returns of all 192; 292 securi-
ties traded in the main exchange markets as of December 2008 from Datastream. If
a security's return index or previous return index is less than 0:01, or greater than
3, or reversed the next day, then that day will be set as missing. Mathematically,
if p1   ri;t1qp1   ri;tq ¤ 0:5, or at least one of ri;t1; ri;t is greater than 3, then
the day t is set to be missing. In addition, we require a stock should have at least
100 non-missing trading days in each semi-annual period; otherwise, the security
would be dropped from this period. It corresponds to Lesmond's requirement of 200
nonmissing trading days within a year. After going through the screening proce-
dure, we have 154; 559 securities traded in 98 markets held by institutions have their
zero-return proportions illiquid measures. Then we pick the securities traded in 52
developed and developing markets and then rank all securities in the same market
by their illiquid measure from the highest (top 1010$ means the most illiquid, i.e.,
the least liquid) to the lowest(bottom 1010$ means the least illiquid, i.e., the most
liquid). We can next compute the weighted average of holding securities ranks for
an institution and claims as the liquidity measure of institutions. Weighted average
scores as an alternative measure of illiquidity level considers all securities in a posi-
tion of their trading market. It avoids the problem of comparing a stock's liquidity
traded in market with the other stock's illiquidity traded in a dierent market.
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1.4 Institutional investors' trading at home and
foreign markets
To examine how institutional investors react to stock market uctuations, we regress
the change in the proportion of institutional domestic assets holdings on the change
of the foreign market volatility.
Table 2, panel A reports the regression results at the institution level by looking
at the eects of the change of foreign markets in which the institutions invest on the
change of the institutional investment proportion in the domestic market. It shows
that foreign market volatility has a positive eect on the institutional domestic
investment. The positive coecient of foreign market volatility change is signicant
for the whole sample as for the U.S. and Non-U.S. institutions. In regressions, we
control for institution domiciled home market by adding the change of home market
return and the proportion of domestic investment from institutions.
Next, we examine more closely how institutions readjust their investments in
home markets by splitting the sample into high and low foreign. We use mean of
foreign market volatilities as a breakpoint. Panels B and C report the regression
of the change of foreign market volatilities on the change of institutional home
market investment proportions when the foreign markets are higher-than-average
volatile or lower-than-average volatile, respectively. Although institutions in general
increase their home investment proportions when faced the downturn from foreign
markets, the U.S. institutions react slightly dierent from non-U.S. institutions.
Note the majority of the U.S. institutions are domestic institutions, while non-U.S.
institutions are mainly international institutions. The U.S. domestic institutions
show a higher tendency of ight home evidence when foreign markets are more
than normal volatile. The coecient of the change in the foreign volatility for the
U.S. domestic institution group is signicant at 1% statistical level. When foreign
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markets becomes less volatile related to other, then U.S. international institutions
react more than other subgroups. The coecient of changes on foreign volatility is
2:816 being signicant at 1% level. Overall, we nd that institutions tend to increase
their investment in domestic market when foreign markets are more volatile.
Table 3 reports the regression of the change in institutional domestic investment
on the change in home market volatility. We see home market volatility drives the
institutions away from the home market with the slightly lower at 10% statistical
signicance level. On the other hand, U.S. domestic institutions investments in
home market are positively aected by the home market volatility. We nd that
U.S. domestic institutions tend to increase home investment when their home market
becomes more volatile. The result perhaps suggests that U.S. institutions consider
their domestic market more appealing than foreign markets due to the fact that the
U.S market is the biggest market in the world. We nd that institutions have the
less tendency to ee from home when home markets are going through the downturn
time period.
Further, we want to investigate the ight-home eect when foreign markets are
extremely volatile, i.e, the nancial crisis time. So we dierentiate the institution
domiciled home market and their investment target market by dening the crisis
period, when market return is 1.3 standard deviations below the mean of market
returns from 1965 to 2011. The crisis time period for the second biggest market U.K.
includes only the second semi-annual of year 2008. There are 50 countries have the
nancial crisis time period identied in the second semi-annual of year 2008. In
order to dierentiate institutional investment in home market and foreign market,
we adopt a foreign dummy variable which equals to 1 when the institutions' home
domiciled country is not the same with institutional investing target country, i.e.,
foreign investment; it equals to 0 when the home country is the same with the target
country, i.e., domestic investment. Models 1 to 6 are regressions without adding
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institutional characteristics, while models 7 to 11 include institution characteristics.
Table 4 shows the regression results of such settings. We followed the method
proposed by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) to test whether institutional investors
moving funds from foreign volatile markets to their home markets From models 1 to
11, we see the negative coecient for ForeignDummy signicant at the 1% level.
For the U.S. and U.K., we nd the higher level of home bias (coecient= -0.589)
than the other institutions domiciled countries (coecient =-0.202). Institutions
tend to favor their home markets compared to foreign markets due to factors in-
troduced by information asymmetry and transaction costs between the home and
foreign markets. More important, our regression strongly supports our nding on
the ight home eect when institutions face the foreign market crisis. The coe-
cient 0:023 for all sample is signicant at 1% level. Since the dependent variable
is the proportion of institutional investment in each target country, the value is
between 0 and 1. So we construct the robust test by using Tobit regression. The
Tobit regression in Model 2 provides the similar and signicant coecient on the
interaction term of the target country crisis and the foreign dummy. Moreover,
the U.S. and U.K. show the higher tendency of ight home compared to the rest
of other countries. The coecient for interaction term for the U.S and the U.K.
institutions is 0:004 signicant at 1% level, while the coecient for the latter is
0:003 with 1% signicance level. This dierence is enlarged by 0:001 after we add
institutional characteristics in Model 7 to 11. To control for target country dier-
ences and time dierences, we include the time and target country xed eects for
all models in Table 4. In addition, when compared the most recent nancial crisis
2007-08 to the previous crises, we run the regression by separating the sample into
two sub-samples. Model 5 and 6 (with institutional characteristics), Model 10 and
11 (without institutional characteristics) clearly demonstrate that the most recent
nancial crisis aects the institutions decision of increasing the home investment
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more deeply than previous crises. The coecient for our interaction term is 3 times
the dierence between the most recent crisis time and the crisis before time.
To sum up, our regressions based on the change of foreign market volatilities
and foreign market crises provide the evidence of the institutional ight home eect
when facing the foreign market tumultuous conditions. The ight home evidence
exists for institutions in our sample.
1.5 Robustness tests on ight home evidence
We show that institutional investors shift their investment to domestic market when
foreign markets become volatile. One question is whether the institutional invest-
ment shifting from foreign to domestic markets could be driven completely by price
changes. To address this question, we run a robustness test on the ight home
testing. With stock prices being xed, we compute the changes of the institution's
proportion of domestic investment as the sum of changes of domestic stock shares
multiplied by the corresponding stock prices, then scaled by the institution's total
portfolio value. Table 4 reports the panel regression results.
Model 1 shows a large overall increase of volatility for foreign markets is as-
sociated with institutions increasing their investments in the home markets. This
association is noticeably stronger in non-US domiciled institutions than that in the
U.S. institutions. The coecient of foreign market volatility for the non-U.S. insti-
tutions in Model 2 equals 6.194 (signicant at 1% level), compared to the coecient
for the U.S. based institutions of 3.873 (equally signicant at 1% level). Model 1
to 3 show that the foreign market conditions actually play an important role in
institutional investors' investment strategy.
To investigate the solo eect of home market volatility on institutional investors
investment, we redo the regression of the change of the home market volatility on the
change of the proportion of institutional investors investment in the home market.
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We nd that home market volatility aects the U.S. institutions more than non-
U.S. institutions. The model shows that for the U.S. institutions, if the U.S. market
becomes more volatile, then institutions investors might be forced to y away from
the home market and emphasize on their investments abroad. This trend, however,
seems not signicant for the non-U.S. institutions.
Next for Model 7 to 9, we put together the changes of the home markets and the
foreign markets to see the horse-racing eect, i.e., whether economic conditions in the
home markets or in the foreign markets aects more than institutions investment.
We nd that overall, foreign volatility aects the institutional investments more
than domestic market conditions do, despite the ndings that the U.S. institutions,
which counts more than half of the sample, show more inuence from domestic
markets. The non-U.S. institutions has shown more eects from foreign volatilities
than from their home markets. The coecient of changes in home volatilities is
3:827, signicant at a 1% level, compared to the equally signicant coecient of
changes of foreign volatility at 2:370. The conclusion is intuitive; the majority of
U.S. institutions are domestic institutions with over 80 percent of their investment
are in domestic markets, while the majority of non-U.S. institutions are international
institutions.
An interesting results from the robustness test is that institutional investors show
an evidence of \ight to safety." We are going to show this trend again by adopting
an newly-proposed safety measure for institutions later. In Model 1 through 9 in
Table 4, we read that institutional investors, being professional money managers,
try to reduce the exposure to the investment risk through balancing between the
domestic investment portfolio and the foreign investment, particulary when markets
uctuate more often.
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1.6 Institutional investors' holdings of liquid as-
sets and dynamic changes of markets
The next question we would like to know is that when institutions increase their
home investment proportions when faced by foreign market volatile conditions, do
their overall holding illiquidity levels increase consequently? That is, we would like
to examine whether institutional investors around the world would prefer to hold
more liquid assets during the nancial turmoil. Table 5 reports the regression of
foreign market volatilities on the institutional weighted average of illiquidity both at
the level and scores. Overall, institutional investors are apt to include more liquid
assets when the foreign investing markets go down and become more volatile, for
the purpose of preparing for the possible redemption or other nancial needs during
the tough times.
Table 5 panel A regresses the changes of institutional overall illiquidity level on
the changes of foreign market volatilities. Panel B regresses the change of institution
illiquidity scores on the foreign market volatility. In order to control the possible ef-
fects imposed by institutional domiciled home countries, we add the change of home
market return and change of proportion of home market value as the percentage of
the world market total value. Time xed eects and home country xed eects are
both considered in all models, except for the U.S. institutions where we drop the
country xed eects, since there is only one home country the U.S. in that sub sam-
ple. To be able to measure the institutional illiquidity, we compute rst the stock
illiquidity by computing the proportion of zero daily returns as of the total existing
trading days in each semi-annual year. Then institution illiquidity level is computed
as the value-weighted of holding stock illiquidity. In order to consider the market
dierence in terms of measuring the zero return proportion, we also compute the
institution illiquidity score as a robustness test based on the ranking of the stock's
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illiquidity in a given exchange market. We rank all stocks traded in the same market
from the highest (rank=10, the most illiquid) to the lowest (rank=1, the least illiq-
uid) in each market. Then we compute the weighted average of the holding stock
ranks as institutions overall liquidity score. The dependent variables in Panel A and
Panel B are institutional overall illiquidity level and scores, respectively.
Table 5 shows that the change in foreign market volatility motivates institution-
s to decrease their portfolio illiquidity level and thus increase their overall holding
liquidity when facing the upward going direction of the foreign market volatile condi-
tions. Model 1 shows the coecient of 0:268 for change of foreign market volatility
at the 1% level for the whole sample in Model 1. The U.S. country domiciled and
non-U.S. country domiciled institutions also shows the ight to liquidity evidenced
by 0:068 signicant at the 1% level and 0:392 signicant at the 1% level, re-
spectively. The regression coecients are enlarged by using the scores based on
the rankings on illiquidity for individual stocks. The results are mainly driven by
the U.S. domestic institutions and non-U.S. international institutions. Note, our
regression results also show that non-U.S. institutions seem to be more sensitive to
the foreign market investment than non-U.S. institutions. This is not surprising s-
ince the largest proportion of non-U.S. country domiciled institutions invest more in
foreign markets than their U.S. peers. The U.S. domestic institutions and non-U.S.
international institutions constitute the major institutions in the sample.
Next, we would also like to know whether any changes in institutional domi-
ciled home country have any eects on an institution's decision on their portfolio's
illiquidity level. So we regress institutional portfolio illiquidity on the institutional
home market volatility. Compared to the foreign market volatilities, we nd that
the home market volatile conditions have a direct eect on institutional decisions on
adjusting the portfolio liquidity. Table 6 represents the evidence of ight to liquidi-
ty. For the whole sample, the coecient for the changes of home volatility is 0:818
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with a signicance at a 1% level. All four groups of institutions show a liquidity
increase of their portfolio when facing the turmoil conditions of the home market,
except for non-U.S. domestic institutions. Our regression also suggests that com-
pared to domestic institutions, international institutions are more actively adjusting
their portfolio when compared with their domestic peers.
Overall, our regression results show that when facing the foreign market volatile
conditions, institutions tend to decrease their portfolio illiquidity and therefore in-
crease the liquidity level. The results are robust with using institutions illiquidity
level or scores.
1.7 Robustness tests on ight to liquidity evidence
So far we observe the changes in liquidity of an institutions' portfolio and we nd that
institutions actively adjust their portfolio's liquidity level according to the changes
in the market conditions that are faced by managers. Using the previous measure,
this attributes to the possibility of the liquidity of the stocks held by the institutions
may change, since the overall macro economic condition of the market changes. So
to verify that institutions actually take action to more liquid stock when the stock
markets drop down, we next x the liquidity of the stocks and see whether, with
liquidity constant, do institutions sell previously illiquid securities and buy liquid
ones during the market volatile time period.
Then we redo the ight to liquidity regression by calculating the institutional
portfolio's illiquidity in an alternative way. That is, we compute the changes of
the weight for the stocks held by institutions rst. Then we sum up the product
of stock illiquidity multiplied by its change of weight to capture the changes of the
institutional illiquid level. The robustness regression stands still and support our
previous conclusion on ight to liquidity proposition. We report the robustness
regression in Table 9.
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Table 9 Model 1 to 3 report the regression of the changes of the institutional
overall illiquidity level on foreign volatilities. After adopting the alternative measure
of calculating the institutional portfolio's illiquidity level, we nd that the negative
eect of foreign market volatility on changes of institutional domestic investment
persists. It shows that institutional investment in home markets decreases by 0:047
percent when foreign market's volatility boost up by 1 percent. The coecient is
signicant at 1% level. Similarly, we show that this negative relations persists when
breaking our sample into two subsamples, the U.S. and the non-U.S. institutions.
The coecient for foreign volatilities in model 2 for the U.S. institutions only equals
to 0:024, signicant at 5% level; the foreign market volatility coecient in model
3 equals to 0:129 with signicance at % level. It clearly shows that the non-U.S.
based institutions adjust their portfolio's illiquidity more actively than their U.S.
peers. This nding is corresponding to the fact that non-U.S. institutions invest
more in foreign markets than their home markets.
Model 4 to 6 in table 9 exhibit the regression results of changes of institution
overall illiquidity level on home volatilities instead. Similarly, the home market con-
ditions have negative eects on institutional illiquidity level. Model 7 to 9 combine
the volatilities of home and foreign markets together in a horse-racing regression.
With consideration of home market eects, foreign market volatilities still stand out
as a major inuence on institution managers' decisions for adjusting their portfo-
lio's exposure to market liquid risk. In this robustness test, we also control for home
markets' illiquidity and returns. The robustness regression supports our conclusion
that institutional investors actually increase their portfolio liquidity level by reduc-
ing the investment on illiquid stocks and adding illiquid stocks, when foreign market
are expected to go through a uctuating time period.
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1.8 Institutional investors' investment risk expo-
sure
Institutional investors are professional money managers. Consequently when fac-
ing the changing economic environment, institutional investors adjust their holding
portfolio's overall risk level. So we investigate whether institutional investors tend
to ight to safety in terms of reducing the holding portfolio risk level, when facing
the foreign market volatile conditions. We adopt the risk shifting measure proposed
by Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (RFS, 2010). The holding based risk shifting measures
is dened as the dierence of institutional current holding standard deviation and
institutional past realized actual returns in the past 3 years. If institutions increase
the holding risk level, then the risk shifting measure is positive, that is, the most up-
dated holding return standard deviation is greater than the past actual institutional
returns; otherwise, the risk shifting measure is negative when institutions decreases
their holding risk level.
Table 7 reports the regression of market return volatility on the risk shifting
measure during the whole sampling period from 1999 to 2008. We nd a signif-
icant negative correlation between market volatility and the risk shifting measure
of the sample. Panel A reports the regression results of institutional risk shifting
and foreign market volatilities. Panel B extends the regression to investigating the
relationship between institutional risk shifting and their domiciled home market
volatilities. The years are from 1999 to 2008. We control for time xed eects and
home country xed eects for all regressions, except in the U.S. sub-sample, we drop
the home country xed eects since there is only a home country in that sub-sample.
Panel A shows that in general, institutions decrease their portfolio risk level when
facing the downturn of the foreign markets in which they invest. The coecient of
FV oalitlity is 0:505 signicant at a 1% level. When separating into the U.S. and
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non-U.S. sample, we nd that the result is mainly driven by non-U.S. international
institutions. This is understandable because, except for the U.S. institutions, the
non-U.S. institution tend to invest more heavily in foreign markets and therefore
will be more subject to the volatile foreign conditions. On the other hand, Panel B
suggests that the U.S. institutions, which the majority of them are domestic insti-
tutions, are more aected by home market volatilities when compared to the other
groups. The coecients of home volatilities for the U.S. international and domestic
institutions are 0:521 and 0:506, both signicant at the 1% level. For non-U.S.
international institutions, the coecient for foreign volatility is 0:668, much higher
compared to 0:392 the coecient for home volatilities, both signicant at a 5%
level. The results indicate that when facing the market downturn, international
institutions are actually more vulnerable compared to their domestic peers.
Overall, our regression supports the hypothesis that institutions tend to shift
downward their holding portfolio risk level when facing foreign market downturn. In
addition, the U.S. domestic institutions are more aected by home market volatilities
than foreign market volatilities.
1.9 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the trading behavior of ight home, ight to safety, and ight
to liquidity of institutions from 1999 to 2008 for 28 institutional domiciled home
countries and 52 target countries based on Factset Lionshares and Datastream. To
our knowledge, this is the rst paper that investigates these three trading behavior
of institutional investors around the world. Particularly, we examine such trading
behavior during the crises time periods. We use the complete Factset Lionshares
data by a complete ten years of institutional holding data. This paper makes a
contribution to topics on institutional investors' investment strategy and market
volatility.
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First, we provide the empirical evidence of institutional ight home trend if for-
eign markets in which institutions invest become more volatile. Further examination
by including crises time periods at the country level conrms the evidence of ight
home eect. We also conduct the robustness tests to exclude the stock price factor
as a reason which drives institutional investors back to their home markets when
facing volatile markets, and thus conrm that institutional investors prefer to hold
more liquid stocks in highly volatile markets.
Second, we present the evidence of institutional investors' ight to liquidity by
showing a signicant negative relation between foreign market volatility condition
and the institutional overall illiquidity level. The conclusion holds by either employ-
ing institution illiquid level or overall illiquid scores based on the ranking of their
holding stock illiquidity measure. We also notice that institutional home domiciled
market volatilities aect negatively on institution holding portfolio's illiquidity. In
addition, institutional investors are also inclined to increase the level of liquidity of
their home portfolios relative to that of their foreign portfolios when there is a surge
in foreign market volatility.
Finally, combining the ight home and ight to liquidity evidence, we claim that
institutions, being the professional money mangers, tend to decrease their holding
portfolio risk level during the foreign market turmoil to be conservative on the
investment opportunities. This shows the trend of institutional investor's ight to
safety by decreasing their risk level when markets become riskier.
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Chapter 2
ESSAY 2: THE ROLE OF MARKET
SENTIMENT IN INSTITUTIONAL HOME
BIAS AROUND THE WORLD
2.1 Introduction
The trend of institutionalization that had been pronounced during the last decade in
the world leads to an enormous literature on examining the trading characteristics
of institutional investors, particularly for the U.S. market. Institutions exhibit the
feedback trading, herding, and momentum trading behavior.: Guercio(1996) shows
that institutions demonstrate strong preference for quality stocks and that little
momentum trading strategies. Apart from institutional trading patterns, researchers
are also interested in how institutional ownership is related to asset pricing and its
possible eects on market stability.;
Among the investigation on institutional trading behavior, academia researches
have particularly interested in investigating institutional home bias. Home bias by
institutional investors refers to the fact that institutions may invest disproportion-
ately more in their domestic markets. Plenty of past literature has been devoted
to such topic for the U.S. market or under international circumstances. For exam-
Refer to Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Schwartz (1991).
:Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) address the evidence of two types of institutional
trading behaviors: herding, dened as institutional investors buying or selling the same stock
simultaneously, and feedback trading, dened as institutional investors buying past winners and
selling past losers, by using a sample of the U.S. pension funds.
;See Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show a positive relation between institutional ownership and
stock returns as well as lag stock returns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) prove that institutions
aects positively stock prices.
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ple, Stulz (1999), De Jong and De Roon (2005), and Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan
(2007) show that investors are not adequately investing in foreign markets. More-
over, Stulz(1999) presents the evidence that the U.S. investors' home bias aects
the cost of capital. Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) examine the mutual fund home
bias scenario for 26 countries. They argue that mutual funds from these countries
allocate disproportionately larger fraction of their investment to domestic markets.
And stock market development and familiarity variables have eects on the home
bias exhibited by mutual funds.
However, substantial research has shown that investors do not exploit the diver-
sication benets and they allocate a relatively large proportion of their investment
in domestic stocks. This so called "home bias" is one of many unsolved puzzles in
the nance. Many studies provide the explanations for this phenomenon. See Chan,
Covrig, and Ng (JF, 2005), Hau and Rey (AER, 2008), Lau, Ng, and Zhang (JFE,
2010), Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (JAR, 2009). This paper is aimed to provided an
alternative explanation for institutional investors' home bias in the international
market.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that investigates the relationships of
three investor sentiments on institutional home bias in the international markets.
We explore the possible eects of three investor sentiment measures on institution-
al home bias from 1999 to 2009 for 14 institutional domiciled countries, based on
Factset Lionshares and Worldscope data. We want to provide a solid alternative
explanation for investors' reluctance to take advantage of the international diversi-
cation benets.
First, following Baker, Wurglar, and Yuan (2011) methods, we construct total
investor sentiment and its two component global sentiments and local sentiments
for 14 countries. We start with four raw sentiment proxies, including the volatility
premium, number of IPOs, the average rst day returns, and market turnover ratio.
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Then we gradually construct total investor sentiment, global investor sentiment, and
local sentiment index in 1999-2009 on a annual basis.
Second, our ndings claim that global investor sentiment sentiment has a s-
tatistically negative impact on institutional home bias. In addition, the Pearson
correlation are signicant at minimum of 1% level.
Next, by regressing the three investor sentiments on institutional home bias
measure, we provide the empirical evidence that global investor sentiment index
reduces the institutional home bias in the international market during the past
decade. The result is robust, either for the sample including the U.S. or excluding
the U.S. Local and Total market sentiment, however, do not show the statistically
signicant eects on home bias.
Last, distance and language have positive and negative eects on institutional
home bias, respectively. The result is consistent with the previous ndings in Chan,
Covrig, and Ng (2005). Investor protection variables such as rule of law index and
risk of expropriation index have a signicant positive eect and negative eect on
home bias.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the databases
and sample statistics for institutions around the world, including a primary de-
scription of home bias, market level investor sentiment index, and other country
level control variables. Section 3 presents the evidence of eects of global and local
investor sentiments on institutional investor home bias, followed by the regression
results and interpretations. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
I retrieve the global institutional investor holding data from Factset Lionshares from
1999 to 2010. 13F ling is the primary source of FactSet LionShares for institution-
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al ownership of U.S.-traded securities.x Institutional ownership data of non-U.S.
trades securities are obtained from publicly available information source, such as
annual reports, rms' websites, transaction announcements, regulatory news ser-
vice, and company proxies, etc. FactSet LionShares collects institutional investor
ownership data across regions in Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, Latin Amer-
ica, Pacic, and Middle West since January 1999. Our sample covers the holding
data of institutions domiciled in 14 countries, inncluding Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. So the absolute majority
of the sample is composed of developed countries.
We choose the semi-annual year-end holdings for institutions rather than quarter-
end or year-end reporting as the holding frequency. The reporting frequencies of
institutional holdings data from Factset Lionshares are quarterly, semi-annually, or
annually. For instance, Japan's institutional holdings are based on annual frequency,
while the U.S. reports regularly on a quarterly basis. We set up the semi-annual
holding frequency to capture accurately the adjustment of institutional holdings
while accommodating the reporting discrepancy among countries during the same
time. In the paper, we examine institutional holdings from the rst semi-annual
year of 1999 to the second semi-annual year of 2010. We require that the home
country must have at least 10 dierent institutions in the sample period.
Monthly market returns and market capitalizations are from Worldscope. 14 in-
stitution domiciled home countries must have the complete macro variables in order
to orthogonalize the raw investor sentiment proxies: consumption growth rate from
x13F lings are mandatory imposed by the SEC for any institutional investors includ-
ing foreign institutional investors managing over $100 million or more on Section 13 se-
curities. A complete list of Section 13 securities is available on the SEC's website at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ists.htm at the end of each quarter. As mentioned
in FactSet LionShares documentation, some institutional investors also report their holding of
non-U.S. traded equity, although it is not required. In such case, FactSet set the default source of
institutions holding as 13F, depending on the portion of this institution's non-U.S. portfolio that
is reported to 13F. Our study includes all types of institutions and all types of securities.
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the Penn World Tables, industrial production growth rate, ination, employ growth
rate, and the term premium from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development(OECD).
There are four initial investor sentiment proxies dened in Baker, Wurgler, and
Yuan(2011). The rst one is volatility premium PV OL, dened as the year-end log
ratio of the value-weighted average market-to-book ratio of high volatility stocks
to that of low volatility stocks. The volatility is specied by the variance of the
prior year's monthly returns and considers the dierences in market returns. It is
based on the variance of residual from regressing stock returns on returns of market
in which the stock is traded. The top three deciles of variance is dened as high
volatile stocks in the market, while the bottom deciles of variance is low volatile
stocks in the market. The second raw proxy of investor sentiment is log number of
IPOs of the country in the year. The third proxy is the average of rst-day returns
of IPOs in the market of the year. The fourth proxy market turnover TURN is the
log market turnover ratio, detrended by a ve-year average for each country. Due
to the data limitation, some countries lack of IPO data. So we consider PV OL
and TURN two proxies only. Table 1 gives the summary statistics for initial four
investor sentiment proxies used in the paper.
Next, we use six macro variables, consumption growth rate, industrial production
growth, employment growth, ination, the term premium, the short-term rate at the
country level to orthogonalize the initial four investor sentiment raw proxies. This
step is remove the information contained in the raw proxies which is irrelevant to the
sentiment raw proxies due to the dierences in macroeconomic situations. Thus, the
total investor sentiment ISTotal index at the country level is the rst rst principal
component of the time-series investor sentiment proxies after orthogonaliation. The
global investor sentiment index for 28 countries is therefore the rst component of
total investor sentiment index ISTotal in the 28 countries in our sample. Last, the
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local investor sentiment index ISLocal is retrieved from the residual of regressing
ISTotal on global sentiment index ISGlobal in the panel regression,
ISTotal  a  ISGlobal   ISLocal
where the residual is estimated for each country separately. Table 1 gives the cor-
relations of initial investor sentiment proxies and total investor sentiment ISTotal at
the country level.
As for investor sentiment index, Italy scores the highest total investor sentiment
index on historical average in 1999-2010. Its total investor sentiment index equals
0.325. The lowest total sentiment index comes from Israel 0:387. On the other
hand, local investor sentiment index is the highest in France with 0.164, while it is
the lowest in Israel with -0.575. Israel has the both lowest total investor sentiment
and lowest local investor sentiment index among 28 countries in the sample.
The monthly market equal-weighted and value-weighted returns are based on
Worldscope data. The initial sample has over 60 countries. We exclude countries
without complete six macro variables and without monthly market returns from
Worldscope. All countries in the sample must also have complete volatility pre-
mium PV OL and log market turnover ratio Turn. The nal sample contains 28
countries from 1999 to 2010. The main control variableMVGDP is the total market
capitalization of country's stock market as a percent of its GDP. The other control
variable at the country level is the log total dollar value of institutions' holdings in
the country. Except monthly market returns, other variables are calculated for each
country and for each year from 1999 through 2010.
Table XI provides the summary statistics on investor sentiment components at
the country level. We list the four market-level sentiment proxies and its correlations
with ISTotal. Take Australia as an example, the average of the rst-day IPO returns
RIPO has a correlation coecient 0:458 with its market total sentiment ISTotal,
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signicant at 5% level. The correlation between log number of IPOs and ISTotal is
0.709, signicant at 1% level. For other countries, most of the coecients between
the raw sentiment proxies and total sentiment index are signicantly positive at a
minimum of 10% level. Therefore, our measure of sentiment index appropriately
grasps the market overall altitude toward stock returns.
2.3 Institutional Home Bias Measure
The dependent variable home bias HB is dened as follows,
HB  WDomestic
W
where WDomestic is the proportion of domestic institution holdings on domestic
traded stocks as of the total dollar holdings of institutions in each country, W is
the market capitalization of country's stock market as of the market capitalization
of the world-market portfolio. Home bias is annual value at the country level. It
gives the idea of whether institutional investors invest disproportionately in their
home countries. Table 1 Panel A presents the time-series average of annual home
bias variable in each country. Among all countries, Poland has the highest home
bias index (HB  6:393) in the sample, while investors in Netherlands rank the
lowest home bias (HB  1:110) toward their investment around the world. The
U.S. has relatively low home bias index with HB  1:279 and the U.K. is HB index
1:351. In the sample, institutional investors from Netherlands, the U.S., and the
U.K. rank the bottom three countries for the lowest home bias attitude toward their
domestic investments. By comparison, Poland, New Zealand, and Turkey domiciled
institutional investors rank the top 3 countries which exhibit the highest home bias
toward their home investments.
Table XII provides the summary statistics for investor sentiment measures and
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country characteristics by country. Panel A presents the time-series average of
country-level characteristics HB, WDomestic, W , MVGDP , ISTotal, and ISLocal,
Law, Accountability, Minority, Expropriation Efficiency, MVGDP , Turnover,
and dummy variable for legal environment DumLegal. Dist is
Tables 2 Panel B gives the Pearson-correlation coecients for HB and the three
investor sentiments, i.e., ISTotal, ISGlobal, and ISLocal. It clear shows that HB
is negatively corrlated with ISGlobal, signicant at the 1% level. Dist is average
of geographical distances. DumLang is the average of common language dummy
variables, based on the World Fact Book. Investor protection variables include
rule of law index Law, accounting standard index Acc, minority investor protection
index Minor, expropriation risk index Expropo, eciency of judicial system index
Eff , and legal system dummy variable DumLegal. MVGDP is the total market
capitalization of country's stock market as a percent of its GDP. Turn is the market-
level turnover ratio retrieved from the World Bank.
2.4 Is market sentiment the driving force behind
institutional home bias?
Institutional home bias has been widely explored and documented in the academia.
Although cross-border investments seem to be quite benecial, institutional investors
are proved to invest disproportionately in their home markets. Many researchers
have provided the clear picture of such home bias, see Lau, Ng, and Zhang (2010)
for an international documentation of institutional home bias. This so called "home
bias" is one of many unsolved puzzles in the nance. Many studies provide the
explanations for this phenomenon. See Chan, Covrig, and Ng (JF, 2005), Hau and
Rey (AER, 2008), Lau, Ng, and Zhang (JFE, 2010), Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (JAR,
2009).
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Therefore, a naturally raised question is: are institutional investors, being large
and professional investors, willing to link their investment strategy to the current
market investment sentiment, Or whether the market overoptimistic and overpes-
simistic would have eects on institutional investors investment decision? To explore
the answers for this question, we take the sample of 28 countries in 1999-2010 to
regressing global, local, and total investor sentiment variables on institutional home
bias in the form of panel regression. Table 3 presents the regression results.
First, Global investor sentiment have a strong negative eects on home bias in
the panel regression. Panel A conducts the panel regression for all countries, al-
l clustered at the country level. Without any control variables, the coecient of
ISGlobal equals 0:071, signicant at 5% level in Model 1(M1). Considering the local
investor sentiment and other control variables, the coecients of ISGlobal are posi-
tive and signicant at least 5% level. M5 adds the control variable MVGDP, and
M9 addsMVGDP and LogInstMV . These three models include only investor sen-
timent index ISGlobal indicates global sentiment index exerts a signicant inuence
on institutional investors home bias toward their domestic markets. This result is
robust, when adding local investor sentiment index of each domestic market. The
globalization of world plays an critical role in institutions investment strategy in the
past decade.
Second, we expect that local investor sentiment ISLocal should peak some sort of
overoptimistic or overpessimistic in the local market and therefore drives the profes-
sional institutional investors away from the domestic market. Our results in Table 2
Panel B supports this hypothesis. Local investor sentiment index ISLocal is negative
associated with institutional home bias in the sample of 28 countries. The coecient
of ISLocal being -0.133 statistically signicant at 5% level. Given the wide-spread
inuence from global market sentiment, M4 still holds the conclusion that local in-
vestor sentiment reduces institutional home bias in the domestic market. Panel A
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also shows that ISLocal negatively aects more on cross-section country level home
bias then it does in time-series country level home bias. The coecient ISlocal is -
0.133 , signicant at 5% level under the regression which including year xed eects.
When included country level time-series control variables such as LogInstMV and
MVGDP , the coecient of ISLocal becomes smaller with less signicance level at
10% level. Surprisingly, despite the fact that two components of market sentiments,
ISGlobal and ISLocal, have signicant associations with disproportionately more in-
vestment toward institutional home markets, total investor sentiment ISTotal has no
signicant eects on such bias behavior in our sample.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the similar regression for all countries excluding the
U.S. The consideration behind is that the U.S. has the largest number of institu-
tional investors and the largest stock market so far, so we would like to see whether
institutions from the rest of the world would be aected equally or similarly by the
global and local investor sentiments. The regression results in Panel B gives the
positive answer. ISLocal is more negatively associated with institutional home bias.
The coecient of ISLocal in M2 is 0:136 with t value being )-2.53, higher than
the coecient in M2 of Panel A where the U.S. are included. ISGlobal and ISLocal
play more important role in institutional home bias: M8 gives the coecients of
ISGlobal 0.113 and ISLocal -0.110, where we include the country level control variable
MVGDP .
Our sample has more European countries than countries in other regions based
on the sample construction and institutional ownership data. So next step we would
like to distinguish European countries and non-European countries to see whether
our results are merely driven by European countries. Panel C and Panel D of Table
3 report the separate regression results for Europe region and non-Europe region,
respectively. The results show that Global investor sentiment still stands out for
explaining institutional home bias toward domestic market more considerably in
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time-series data than in cross-sectional data. M4 in Panel C and M17 in Panel
B supports our results. The coecient of ISGlobal in M4 of Panel C equals 0:095
with signicance at 5% level, while it equals 0:123 in Panel D M17 with the same
statistical signicance. Global sentiment index aects more on home bias in Non-
European countries than in European region. This may relate to the fact of similar
scal and nancial policies of European Union, which is formed formally already
during our sample period 1999-2010. ISLocal sentiment index have the stronger
signicant negative eects on home bias in European countries than in non-European
countries. The explanation could be that non-European group contains the U.S. and
Canada. Both countries have the much lower home bias to start with, compared
with other countries in the sample.
Overall, global and local investor sentiments signicant aect institutional home
bias behavior around the world. The global investor sentiment strengthens home
bias, while the local investor sentiment reduces it. Our regression results in sub-
groups of the U.S. versus Non-U.S. and subgroups of European countries versus
non-European countries support our conclusion. Moreover, Global sentiments have
more considerably positive eect on fostering institutional investment more dispro-
portionately in domestic market at the cross-section level, while ISLocal drives down
such disproportionately investment in domestic market more at the time-series level.
2.5 Robustness tests on the eect of global senti-
ment on home bias
Considering the fact that the U.S. is the largest stock market in the sample, I ex-
clude the U.S. market in the robustness regression to make sure that our ndings
are not practically driven by the U.S. I run the regression model 4, 8, 11, and model
14 in the robustness tests. Model 8 conrms the previous ndings. The coecient
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of ISGlobal equals -0.115, signicant at 1% level. It shows that for the non-U.S. coun-
tries in the sample, we still witness that global sentiment drives down institutional
overly investment in domestic market. Next, in Model 8 we include the stock market
development variables market turnover Turn and MVGDP , the negative correla-
tion between ISGlobal and HB stands still at 5% level. M11 includes the familiarity
variables Distance Dist and average of dummy variables for language DumLang.
The negative impact of global sentiment on institutional home bias continues at
5% level. The coecient of DumLang is signicantly positive at 5% level indicates
that institutional investors have investment preference on those foreign countries
which share the same ocial language. Last, I include the set of investor protection
variables. The coecient of ISGlobal equals 0:099, signicant at 1% level.
Overall, the robustness tests strongly support the previous ndings that global
market sentiment index reduces institutional home bias.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the possible eects of three investor sentiment measures
on institutional home bias from 1999 to 2009 for 14 institutional domiciled countries
based on Factset Lionshares and Worldscope data. To our knowledge, this is the rst
paper that investigates the relationships of three investor sentiments on institutional
home bias in the international markets. We examine such relationship for several
dierent subgraoups and we use the complete Factset Lionshares data from 1999
to 2009. We explore impact of market sentiment on home bias for 14 countries
around the world. We decompose the investor sentiment index into global and local
sentiment indices. My study shows that a wave of global sentiment has a statistically
signicant negative eect on country-level home bias.
Our sample shows a signicant negative impact of global sentiment on institu-
tional home bias and the negative correlation between local investor sentiment and
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home bias. The Pearson correlation between global sentiment and home bias across
14 countries is signicant at the 1% level.
Familiarity variables such as distance and language have positive and negative
signicant eects on institutional home bias, respectively. The result is compatible
with the previous research ndings. Institutional investors show a smaller home bias
when the home country and the host country share a common language or have a
relatively closer geographical distance.
Third, Investor protection variables such as rule of law index and risk of expro-
priation index have a signicant positive eect and negative eect on home bias,
respectively. We show that institutional investors tend to invest a relatively large
proportion of their investments in a country which strongly practices its law and
expropriation risk is small.
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Table XI: Summary Statistics on Investor Sentiment Components by Country
The table presents the summary statistic for four investor sentiment proxies for 14 countries around the world based on the
period of 1980-2011. The rst proxy RIPO is the average rst-day returns of initial public oerings(IPO) in the year for each
country. The second proxy NIPO equals the log number of IPO in the year for each market. The third proxy PV OL is the log
ratio of the equal-weighted average market-to-book ratios of high volatile stocks(located on the top three decides of idiosyncratic
volatility ranked by country) to low volatile stocks(located on the bottom three decides of idiosyncratic volatility). The fourth
proxy Turn is the log market turnover, i.e., the total dollar trading volume through the year divided by the prior year-end total
market capitalization, then detrended with up-to-eight-year moving average. ISTotal index is the rst principal component of
four time-series macro variable orthogonalized investor sentiment proxies at the country level. The last two columns show the
Pearson correlation (corr.) with total investor sentiment ISTotal and the corresponding p-values.
Corr. with
Country Proxy Mean Std Min Max ISTotal p value
Australia RIPO 0.138 0.131 -0.085 0.498 0.458 (0.032)
NIPO 3.649 1.340 0.693 5.268 0.709 (0.000)
PV OL 0.233 0.425 -0.676 0.834 0.486 (0.022)
TURN -0.024 0.547 -1.739 0.634 0.372 (0.088)
Canada RIPO 0.058 0.048 -0.038 0.198 0.653 (0.000)
NIPO 2.609 0.878 1.386 4.248 0.478 (0.007)
PV OL 0.403 0.396 -0.038 2.203 -0.117 (0.537)
TURN 0.171 0.387 -0.364 1.719 0.664 (0.000)
Denmark RIPO 0.061 0.081 -0.100 0.263 0.608 (0.006)
NIPO 1.387 0.980 0.000 3.296 0.728 (0.000)
PV OL 0.194 0.380 -0.459 0.958 0.315 (0.190)
TURN 0.046 0.505 -0.983 1.319 -0.241 (0.321)
France RIPO 0.085 0.114 -0.358 0.293 0.832 (0.000)
NIPO 3.136 1.134 0.693 4.796 0.743 (0.002)
PV OL 0.030 0.603 -0.897 1.706 0.442 (0.099)
TURN 0.040 0.522 -0.896 1.254 0.373 (0.171)
Germany RIPO 0.124 0.142 -0.002 0.541 0.554 (0.014)
NIPO 2.792 1.127 0.000 5.165 0.590 (0.008)
PV OL 0.010 0.722 -1.334 1.777 0.391 (0.098)
TURN 0.566 2.105 -0.679 9.147 0.550 (0.015)
Italy RIPO 0.151 0.222 -0.097 0.808 -0.163 (0.531)
NIPO 2.237 0.743 0.693 3.738 0.514 (0.035)
PV OL -0.065 0.634 -1.032 2.021 0.849 (0.000)
TURN 0.453 0.851 -0.475 2.622 -0.268 (0.299)
Japan RIPO 0.409 0.346 0.076 1.379 0.682 (0.000)
NIPO 4.327 0.767 2.565 5.313 0.601 (0.001)
PV OL 0.425 0.277 -0.375 0.904 0.664 (0.000)
TURN 0.622 2.078 -1.744 7.981 0.174 (0.404)
Netherlands RIPO 0.122 0.188 -0.035 0.849 -0.305 (0.463)
NIPO 1.647 0.990 0.000 3.258 0.001 (0.999)
PV OL 0.288 1.622 -3.138 3.534 0.131 (0.756)
TURN 0.304 1.159 -0.425 5.166 -0.421 (0.299)
New Zealand RIPO 0.080 0.069 -0.004 0.213 -0.460 (0.212)
NIPO 1.664 0.759 0.000 3.045 0.728 (0.026)
PV OL 0.103 0.650 -0.853 1.189 0.449 (0.226)
TURN 0.210 0.311 -0.317 0.577 -0.391 (0.298)
Poland RIPO 0.169 0.252 -0.169 1.004 0.257 (0.474)
NIPO 2.317 1.212 0.000 4.220 0.081 (0.825)
PV OL -0.070 0.271 -0.563 0.342 0.189 (0.600)
TURN -0.058 0.486 -0.957 0.751 0.271 (0.449)
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TABLE 11
Investor Sentiment Index of 14 Countries (continued)
Corr. with
Country Proxy Mean Std Min Max ISTotal p value
Sweden RIPO 0.140 0.183 -0.215 0.600 0.527 (0.010)
NIPO 2.124 0.755 0.693 3.296 0.561 (0.005)
PV OL 0.248 0.663 -1.002 1.796 0.579 (0.004)
TURN -0.010 0.695 -1.383 1.638 0.388 (0.067)
Switzerland RIPO 0.107 0.107 -0.023 0.362 0.324 (0.221)
NIPO 1.559 0.904 0.000 2.890 0.589 (0.016)
PV OL 0.238 0.581 -0.267 2.334 0.493 (0.052)
TURN -0.018 0.475 -0.584 1.307 -0.379 (0.148)
United Kingdom RIPO 0.170 0.160 0.063 0.843 0.282 (0.273)
NIPO 4.360 0.765 1.946 5.429 0.770 (0.000)
PV OL -0.016 0.428 -0.940 0.892 0.783 (0.000)
TURN -0.001 0.334 -0.959 0.584 0.068 (0.795)
United States RIPO 0.165 0.133 0.064 0.710 0.665 (0.000)
NIPO 5.402 0.958 3.045 6.860 0.337 (0.069)
PV OL 0.356 0.471 -0.526 1.475 0.388 (0.034)
TURN 0.102 0.629 -1.195 2.322 0.515 (0.004)
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Table XIII: Evolution of the Home Bias for France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States
The table presents time-series average of home bias, total, local, and global sentiment index for all countries in three subperiods,
1999-2001, 2002-2005, and 2006-2009. Home Bias (HB) equals to the log ratio of WDomestic to W , where WDomestic is the
proportion of domestic institution holdings on domestic traded stocks as of the total dollar holdings of institutions in each
country. W is the market capitalization of country's stock market as of the market capitalization of the world-market portfolio.
ISTotal index is the rst principal component of four time-series macro variable orthogonalized investor sentiment proxies in
each country. Local investor sentiment ISLocal is the residual of regression ISTotal  a  ISGlobal   ISLocal in the year for
each country. Global investor sentiment index ISGlobal is the rst principal component of the total investor sentiment index
ISTotal in 14 countries. The sample period is from 1999 to 2009.
Country Period WDomestic W HB ISTotal ISLocal ISGlobal
Australia 1999-2001 0.101 0.015 2.013 0.118 -0.526 2.282
2002-2005 0.740 0.023 3.462 0.541 0.602 -0.197
2006-2009 0.729 0.029 3.211 0.307 0.406 -0.330
Canada 1999-2001 0.469 0.029 2.775 0.798 -0.235 2.392
2002-2005 0.595 0.037 2.790 -0.413 -0.327 -0.197
2006-2009 0.570 0.046 2.522 -0.248 -0.105 -0.330
Denmark 1999-2001 0.042 0.004 2.684 0.360 -0.042 2.116
2002-2005 0.123 0.005 3.087 -1.175 -1.207 -0.197
2006-2009 0.189 0.006 3.448 0.358 0.480 -0.330
France 1999-2001 0.341 0.051 2.040 -0.220 -0.658 2.392
2002-2005 0.597 0.052 2.446 -0.079 -0.022 -0.197
2006-2009 0.495 0.064 2.038 -0.839 -0.757 -0.330
Germany 1999-2001 0.149 0.047 1.150 0.498 -0.224 2.392
2002-2005 0.265 0.038 1.926 -0.508 -0.374 -0.197
2006-2009 0.265 0.047 1.729 -0.981 -0.833 -0.330
Italy 1999-2001 0.113 0.025 1.487 1.473 1.027 2.116
2002-2005 0.198 0.025 2.055 -0.242 -0.157 -0.197
2006-2009 0.244 0.024 2.306 0.240 0.355 -0.330
Japan 1999-2001 0.274 0.121 0.283 1.298 0.560 2.392
2002-2005 0.616 0.123 1.568 1.310 1.374 -0.197
2006-2009 0.764 0.126 1.788 -0.121 -0.016 -0.330
Netherlands 1999-2001 0.010 0.022 -0.771 -0.584 -0.696 2.392
2002-2005 0.028 0.019 0.249 0.411 0.526 -0.197
2006-2009 0.069 0.019 1.285 0.106 -0.017 2.518
New Zealand 2002-2005 0.713 0.001 6.028 -0.023 0.301 0.053
2006-2009 0.178 0.001 5.067 1.915 1.016 2.518
Poland 2002-2005 0.952 0.002 6.108 1.103 1.073 0.387
2006-2009 0.887 0.005 5.249 -0.167 -0.057 -0.330
Sweden 1999-2001 0.582 0.011 3.887 0.382 -0.254 2.392
2002-2005 0.487 0.011 3.774 -0.769 -0.630 -0.197
2006-2009 0.488 0.013 3.651 1.000 0.770 -0.330
Switzerland 1999-2001 0.018 0.026 -0.283 1.899 1.440 2.392
2002-2005 0.154 0.028 1.492 -0.498 -0.301 -0.197
2006-2009 0.238 0.034 1.940 -0.510 -0.613 0.986
United Kingdom 1999-2001 0.108 0.095 -0.662 0.698 -0.273 2.392
2002-2005 0.255 0.094 0.996 -0.192 -0.030 -0.197
2006-2009 0.269 0.088 1.128 -0.380 -0.160 -0.330
United States 1999-2001 0.949 0.565 0.519 2.488 1.441 2.392
2002-2005 0.923 0.543 0.531 0.009 0.095 -0.197
2006-2009 0.826 0.497 0.507 -0.504 -0.360 -0.330
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CURRICULUM VITAE
 EDUCATION
Ph.D. in Finance January 2008 - August 2013 (Expected)
Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Minor in Economics
M.S. in Mathematics September 2002 - July 2005
College of Mathematics, Sichuan University, China
Concentration in Functional Analysis
B.S. in Mathematics September 1996 - July 2000
Department of Mathematics, China West Normal University, China
Concentration in Mathematical Education
 AREA OF EXPERTISE
Research: International Investment, Institutional Investors, and Corpo-
rate Governance.
My current research focuses on institutional investor trading behavior
during nancial crises around the world.
Teaching: International Investment, Intermediate Financial Manage-
ment, Principles of Finance, Managerial Economics, and Business Statis-
tics.
 HONORS AND AWARDS
American Finance Association (AFA) Doctoral Student Travel Grant
$1; 500, Denver, 2011.
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Midwest Finance Association Travel Grant $500, Chicago, 2011.
Second Place for Graduate School Entrance Examination, Sichuan Uni-
versity, China, 2005.
Award of Outstanding Graduate Scholarship, China West Normal Uni-
versity, China, 2000.
 WORK INFORMATION
Instructor, Lubar School of Business, UW-Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 2010-
present.
Teaching Assistant, Lubar School of Business, UW-Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin, 2008-2010.
Mathematics Tutor, Tutoring and Academic Resource Center, UW-Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, 2008.
Teaching Assistant, Sichuan University, China, 2002-2005.
Mathematics Teacher, Qingyang Middle School, Chengdu, Sichuan, Chi-
na, 2000-2001.
 RESEARCH
\Institutional Investor Trading Behavior and Global Financial
Crises"
This paper investigates the trading behavior of institutional investors
from 28 countries around the world. During the period 1999 to 2008, we
nd strong empirical evidence that institutional investors tend to move
their funds out of volatile foreign equity markets and back to their home
markets, particularly in the recent 2007-2008 global crisis. Our results
show that institutional investors prefer to hold more liquid stocks in high-
ly volatile markets, suggesting evidence of ight to liquidity. Institutional
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investors are also inclined to increase the level of liquidity of their home
portfolios relative to that of their foreign portfolios when there is a surge
in foreign market volatility. Finally, we show that the overall portfolio
risk of institutional investors reduces during the nancial crisis period.
Presented in Midwest Finance Conference in Chicago, 2011.
Midwest Finance Conference Travel Award $500, 2011.
American Finance Association (AFA) Doctoral Student Travel Grant
$1; 500, 2011.
\International Institutional Investor's Herding around theWorld,"
with Chan Ho Cho
This paper investigates the institutional herding behavior in 52 countries
including 22 developed countries and 30 emerging countries from year
1999 to year 2009 by using a comprehensive institutional investor hold-
ing database FactSet LionShares. We particularly exmaine the herding
behaviors during the nancial turmoil in 2008. We document that institu-
tional herding behavior happens more often in developed countries than
emerging countries and foreigner institutional investors herd more than
domestic institutional investors on average across the world. Moreover,
institutional investors herd more during nancial crisis period of year 2008
than pre-crisis period. Last, our evidence shows that foreign institutional
investor herding has predicting power for their target investment coun-
try GDP growth rate as well as stock market capitalization over the time.
\Investor Sentiment and Institutional Investor Home Bias"
I investigate whether investor sentiment inuences institutional trading
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behavior. The paper addresses the following questions. First, is there any
relation between investor market sentiment and institutional home bias
phenomenon? Second, can investor sentiment explain the pronounced in-
stitutional herding behavior around the world, especially during the glob-
al nancial crises? Last, is there any dierence in this relation between
developed and developing countries? Do domestic and foreign institu-
tional investors have dierent atxtitude regarding the market sentiment
in highly volatile markets?
 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Presenter: \Institutional Trading Behavior and Global Financial Crises"
Lubar School of Business Brown Bag Seminar, UW-Milwaukee, 2012.
Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2011.
Discussant:
Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Meeting, Denver, 2011.
Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2011.
Attendee:
American Finance Association (AFA), Denver, 2012.
Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Meeting, Denver, 2011.
 UNIVERSITY TEACHING EVIDENCE
Instructor: full responsibility for course design, teaching, and grading
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Spring 2013: Intermediate Financial Management 4.65/5.0
Fall 2012: International Financial Management 4.63/5.0
Summer 2012: Principles of Finance 4.56/5.0
Spring 2012: Intermediate Financial Management 4.58/5.0
Fall 2011: International Financial Management 4.26/5.0
Spring 2011: Managerial Economics 4.46/5.0
Winterim 2011: Managerial Economics 4.89/5.0
Fall 2010: Managerial Economics 4.15/5.0
Teaching Assistant: independently leading weekly review sessions
Spring 2010: Managerial Economics
Summer 2009: Business Statistics
Spring 2009: Business Statistics
 MEMBERSHIPS
American Finance Association
Financial Management Association
Midwest Finance Association
 COMPUTER SKILLS
SAS, Matlab, Maple, Microsoft Oce, and Latex.
